Selection of subcontractors using ordinal ranking methods based on Condorcet approach
© 2016 Budownictwo i Architektura. Publikacja na licencji Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 (CC BY-NC-SA 4.0)
Cytowanie: Budownictwo i Architektura, 15(4) (2016) 033-040, ISSN 1899-0665, DOI: 10.24358/Bud-Arch_16_154_04
| Historia: | Opublikowano: | 01-12-2016 |
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Streszczenie:
A choice of a subcontractor may have critical impact on realization of the project, it has influence on the cost, duration, and quality. Selection of the best sucontractor can be defined as multiple criteria decision making problem (MCDM) of choosing a proper offer from set of alternatives evaluated by using set of criteria. Decision maker should determine the criteria as objective and measurable. Significance of decision making problem is presented by large amount of theories and methods developed for solving MCDM problems and number of criteria considered in these problems. A Condorcet method (formulated over two centuries ago) is commonly accepted for democratic (majority of criteria determines the winner) and fair election – a Condorcet winner is the alternative which is preferred in all pair-wise comparisons. According to social choice theory where a Condorcet winner cannot be obtained from a set of alternatives, the best solution is close to being a Condorcet winner. The paper presents four selection methods of the best alternative that is as close as possible to being a Condorcet winner and contains examples of a subcontractor selection using only ordinal scales of evaluation of alternatives.
Słowa kluczowe:
project management, subcontractors selection, social choice theory, the Condorcet winner
Selection of subcontractors using ordinal ranking methods based on Condorcet approach
Abstract:
A choice of a subcontractor may have critical impact on realization of the project, it has influence on the cost, duration, and quality. Selection of the best sucontractor can be defined as multiple criteria decision making problem (MCDM) of choosing a proper offer from set of alternatives evaluated by using set of criteria. Decision maker should determine the criteria as objective and measurable. Significance of decision making problem is presented by large amount of theories and methods developed for solving MCDM problems and number of criteria considered in these problems. A Condorcet method (formulated over two centuries ago) is commonly accepted for democratic (majority of criteria determines the winner) and fair election – a Condorcet winner is the alternative which is preferred in all pair-wise comparisons. According to social choice theory where a Condorcet winner cannot be obtained from a set of alternatives, the best solution is close to being a Condorcet winner. The paper presents four selection methods of the best alternative that is as close as possible to being a Condorcet winner and contains examples of a subcontractor selection using only ordinal scales of evaluation of alternatives.
Keywords:
project management, subcontractors selection, social choice theory, the Condorcet winner
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